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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 12-4311 
_________ 
 
KENNETH J. TAGGART, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NORWEST MORTGAGE INC., D/B/A America's Servicing Company; 
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Trustee for Morgan Stanley 
ABS Capital  I Inc., Trust 2007-HE2 
 ________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-01281) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2013 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 13, 2013)  
 
______________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
_______________ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Kenneth J. Taggart appeals the District Court’s grant of judgment in favor of the 
current owners and servicers of his mortgage loan (collectively, “the defendants”).  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 In August of 2006, Taggart applied for a mortgage loan on a property he owned in 
Holland, Pennsylvania.  He closed on an adjustable-rate mortgage on September 15, 
2006.  The mortgage was subsequently securitized.   
In 2009, Taggart brought suit against the defendants, alleging a litany of violations 
of federal and Pennsylvania law in the origination and servicing of the loan.  Of relevance 
here, Taggart alleged that his original lender and broker violated § 2607 of the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“RESPA”), and various 
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (“TILA”), by charging 
unearned fees and by failing to disclose fees, costs, and features of the loan prior to 
settlement.  Several other claims alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Laws, 73 P.S. § 201.1 et seq. (“UTPCPL”).  The 
remainder of Taggart’s allegations are not at issue on appeal. 
After careful analysis of Taggart’s many claims, the District Court eventually 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all but one.  Taggart later withdrew the 
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surviving claim, and the District Court entered final judgment for the defendants.  
Taggart now appeals.1
II. 
   
Taggart first contests the District Court’s dismissal of his RESPA claims and 
TILA damages claims, which the District Court held to be time-barred.  “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Our review of an 
order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary.  See Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of 
Phila., Dep't of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007).     
As the District Court held, both Taggart’s RESPA claims and his TILA damages 
claims were subject to a one-year limitations period from the occurrence of the violation.  
See 12 U.S.C. § 2614; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).2
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  Because the alleged unearned fees were 
charged at the September 2006 closing, and any failure to make required pre-settlement 
disclosures had also occurred by that date, the limitations period had expired when 
Taggart brought his suit in 2009.  Taggart argues that the limitations period should be 
equitably tolled, but has not alleged facts demonstrating that the defendants prevented 
 
2 Since Taggart filed this suit, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, passed in 2010, has extended the limitations period to three years for a 
subset of TILA damages claims.  See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1416(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 
2153 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)).  That subset does not include the claims that 
Taggart appeals. 
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him from filing suit earlier, or “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”  
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).  The District Court properly found 
Taggart’s RESPA claims and TILA damages claims to be time-barred. 
III. 
 Second, Taggart contests the District Court’s dismissal of his TILA rescission 
claims.  Generally, a borrower may rescind a mortgage within three days of the 
consummation of the loan, delivery of notice of the borrower’s right to rescind, or 
delivery of certain “material disclosures,” whichever happens last.  Regulation Z, 12 
C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (implementing 15 U.S.C. § 1635).  If the notice or material 
disclosures are never delivered, the right to rescind endures for three years after the loan 
closing.  See id.  Taggart argues that the three-year limitations period applies in his case.   
Regulation Z defines “material disclosures” as “the annual percentage rate 
[including the existence of a variable-rate feature], the finance charge, the amount 
financed, the total of payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures and limitations 
referred to in §§ 226.32(c) and (d) and 226.35(b)(2).”  Id. n.48; see also id. supp. I, subpt. 
C, cmt. 2.  It is undisputed that the defendants provided notice of Taggart’s right to 
rescind and a TILA disclosure statement – containing the annual percentage rate, finance 
charge, amount financed, total of payments, and payment schedule – in September of 
2006.3
                                              
3 The defendants appended these documents, signed by Taggart, to their motion to 
dismiss.  Taggart does not dispute their authenticity.  “[A] court may consider an 
undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to 
dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.”  Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. 
  Of the remaining “material disclosures,” the District Court determined that § 
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226.32 does not apply to Taggart’s loan.4
IV. 
  Taggart has not appealed that ruling.  Nor does 
Taggart allege any violation of § 226.35(b)(2).  Because Taggart has not identified any 
applicable material disclosure that was never delivered, he has not stated a plausible 
claim for an extended right to rescind. 
Last, in his counseled reply brief Taggart argues that the District Court should 
have declined jurisdiction over his UTPCPL claims once it dismissed his federal claims.  
Even if this argument were not waived, see In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 
2003) (holding that issues not raised in appellant’s opening brief are waived), it would 
lack merit.  “A district court's decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction 
after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely 
discretionary.”  Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  In this case the state claims were largely duplicative of the federal 
claims.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating them. 
V. 
 The District Court considered all of Taggart’s claims with exhaustive care, and we 
perceive no error.  We will affirm the grant of judgment in favor of the defendants.  
                                                                                                                                                  
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  Taggart claims to have 
received the disclosures several days late, but late delivery does not trigger the three-year 
extension period.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).  
 
4 This court’s dicta in McCutcheon v. America’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 150 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2009), suggesting that certain § 226.32(c) disclosures are “material disclosures” for 
any variable-rate loan, appears to have overlooked the coverage criteria in § 226.32(a).  
